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Abstract
Introduction Nine events have been assessed for
potential declaration of a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC). A PHEIC is defined as an
extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk
to other states through international spread and requires
a coordinated international response. The WHO Director-
General convenes Emergency Committees (ECs) to provide
their advice on whether an event constitutes a PHEIC.
The EC rationales have been criticised for being non-
transparent and contradictory to the International Health
Regulations (IHR). This first comprehensive analysis of EC
rationale provides recommendations to increase clarity
of EC decisions which will strengthen the IHR and WHO’s
legitimacy in future outbreaks.
Methods 66 EC statements were reviewed from nine
public health outbreaks of influenza A, Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus, polio, Ebola virus
disease, Zika, yellow fever and coronavirus disease-2019.
Statements were analysed to determine which of the
three IHR criteria were noted as contributing towards the
EC’s justification on whether to declare a PHEIC and what
language was used to explain the decision.
Results Interpretation of the criteria were often vague
and applied inconsistently. ECs often failed to describe and
justify which criteria had been satisfied.
Discussion Guidelines must be developed for the
standardised interpretation of IHR core criteria. The
ECs must clearly identify and justify which criteria
have contributed to their rationale for or against PHEIC
declaration.
Conclusion Striving for more consistency and
transparency in EC justifications would benefit future
deliberations and provide more understanding and support
for the process.

Introduction
In the aftermath of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, the WHO
fundamentally revised the International
Health Regulations (IHR), which entered
into force in 2007. The 196 States Parties
to the IHR recognised that certain public

Key questions
What is already known?
►► There has been increasing criticism over Public

Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)
declarations and non-declarations by public health
and international law experts.
►► Critics have claimed that the rationale used by
Emergency Committees (ECs) to recommend or not
recommend a PHEIC to the WHO Director-General
can be contradictory, non-transparent and, in some
cases, in direct violation of the criteria as defined by
the International Health Regulations (IHR).

What are the new findings?
►► We conducted the first, comprehensive, formal re-

view and analysis of official statements published
on behalf of ECs by the WHO to definitively identify
the rationale reported for declaring or not declaring a
PHEIC and analyse how that rationale matches with
criteria set forth by the IHR.
►► There was considerable inconsistency and application of the criteria for a PHEIC as defined by the IHR.

What do the new findings imply?
►► A more standardised and transparent process for

ECs is needed to assess the event and determine if a
PHEIC declaration is warranted for the public health
making
community to understand the decision-
process.
►► Guidelines that include the standardised definitions
and how they should be assessed for each of the
three core IHR criteria is necessary for future PHEIC
declarations to ensure confidence in the IHR EC process remains.

health events pose a significant risk to the
global community and should be designated as a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC). Under
Article I of the IHR, a PHEIC is defined
by three criteria: an extraordinary event
which ‘constitute[s] a public health risk to
other States through international spread of
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about the negative impacts that PHEIC declarations may
trigger, especially travel and trade restrictions.3 5
To date, there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis
of EC recommendations and WHO DG decision-making
regarding PHEIC declarations. To describe how the EC
and the WHO DG relied on and interpreted these criteria
in previous decisions to declare or not to declare PHEICs,
we examined the EC’s decision-making in all instances
where it has met from when the revised IHR entered
into force in 2007. We summarised and categorised the
justifications offered by the EC, identified the criteria
used in each situation and compared these to criteria for
PHEICs outlined by the IHR. Based on this analysis, we
offer important recommendations for increasing transparency and consistency in EC recommendations and
PHEIC decision-making. Adoption of these regulations
would strengthen IHR decision-making and WHO legitimacy in responding to major outbreaks.
Methods
We searched the WHO’s website for all instances where
the WHO DG convened an EC from when the revised
IHR entered into force in 2007. During this review, we
identified a total of nine public health events for which
ECs were convened: the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic
(2009–2010), the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outbreak (2013–2015), the international spread of poliovirus (2014-ongoing), the West
Africa EVD outbreak (2014–2016), the Zika virus outbreak
(2016), yellow fever (2016), the 9th EVD outbreak in
the Equateur province of DRC (2018), the 10th EVD
outbreak in DRC which began in the North Kivu and Ituri
provinces (2018-ongoing) and the on-going epidemic of
COVID-19. We identified the number of EC meetings
that were convened for each health event and collected
the official statements detailing the WHO DG’s decision
and the EC’s justification. While EC meetings were often
followed by a press conference where the WHO DG and
the chair of the EC reported on their internal discussions
and ultimate decision as well as answered questions from
journalists, it was decided that these discussions would
not be included in the scope of this study. For each of
the aforementioned health events, we also identified and
recorded epidemiological characteristics of the outbreaks
including date of detection, date of initial EC meeting,
number of countries affected prior to initial EC meeting
as well as the total number of countries affected, and the
average case fatality rate reported over the course of the
outbreak.
There were a total of 66 EC meetings for review (H1N1
CoV (n=10), polio (n=22), West Africa
(n=9), MERS-
EVD (n=9), Zika (n=5), yellow fever (n=2), ninth EVD
in DRC (n=1), 10th EVD in DRC (n=6), COVID-19
(n=2)).3 4 Each EC statement was analysed to determine
which of the three fundamental IHR criteria were noted
as contributing towards the EC’s justification on whether
to declare a PHEIC, and specifically, what language was
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502
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disease and…potentially require[s] a coordinated international response.’ The IHR (Annex 2) provides a ‘decision instrument’ that guides States Parties as to which
health events have the potential to become PHEICs,
thus requiring reporting to WHO. [Annex 2 of the IHR
provides a decision instrument for States Parties to assess
which events detected by national surveillance systems
would require notification to the WHO. This includes
a single case of smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type
poliovirus, human influenza caused by a new subtype
and SARS. Other health events that have the potential
to cause international public health concerns or serious
impact trigger an algorithm to determine if notification
to WHO is required. Criteria for this algorithm include
determining if the event is serious, unusual or unexpected, has a significant risk of international spread, or
poses a significant risk of international travel or trade
restrictions. If two of the criteria are true, then notification to WHO is required under the IHR]. The IHR
also empowers the WHO Director-
General (DG) to
convene an Emergency Committee (EC) which consists
of international experts brought together on an ad-hoc
basis. The EC provides their advice on whether the
current situation should be considered a PHEIC, and
what Temporary Recommendations should be given to
Member States to bolster the response and control the
outbreak. Ultimately, however, the WHO DG has sole
authority to declare a PHEIC and make Temporary
Recommendations for Member States to follow.1
The WHO’s decision-making under the IHR has come
under intense scrutiny, especially its decision whether
to declare a PHEIC. Global commissions, for example,
strongly criticised the organisation for waiting 4 months
after international spread of Ebola virus disease (EVD)
in West Africa (2014–2016) before declaring an emergency.2 During the ongoing EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EC met a total of six
times but did not declare a PHEIC until the fourth convocation, more than 11 months after the outbreak began.3 4
Most recently, the WHO’s judgement in response to coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) has been questioned.
The WHO DG first convened the EC on January 22, but
announced it had insufficient data from China to arrive at
a decision. The following day, the EC was almost equally
divided, but ultimately said it was too early to declare
a PHEIC. Seven days later, on 30 January 2020 during
the second EC meeting, the DG declared a PHEIC. The
WHO DG openly stated that the IHR should be reformed
to allow intermediate levels for declaring an emergency,
suggesting that an all or nothing standard hindered EC
decision-making.3 5
Experts have urged WHO to clarify how decisions
should be reached,6–8 as well as proposing greater transparency in the EC decision-
making process to better
understand why the Committee recommended or did not
recommend a PHEIC declaration.9 Overall, the IHR EC
decision-making process is open to considerable interpretation.10 In addition, the WHO DG has raised concerns
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Patient and public involvement
Patients and the public were not involved in this study.
Results
Of the nine events analysed, PHEICs were declared in six
instances: H1N1 in 2009, Poliovirus in 2014, West Africa
EVD outbreak in 2014, Zika outbreak in 2016, the 10th
DRC EVD outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in
2019, and the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak (table 1).3 4
Detailed information on each EC meeting and the criteria
identified as contributing to the rationale of EC justifications can be found in online supplementary file 1.
H1N1 pandemic
Approximately 1 month after initial cases were detected,
the first EC was convened and a PHEIC declared. The
EC indicated that all three conditions for a PHEIC had
been met: the event was considered extraordinary, there
was a public health risk to other States via international
spread, and an international response was required to
control the outbreak. The EC met a total of nine times
throughout the pandemic but did not recommend the
PHEIC be declared over until 10 August 2010 as it ‘no
longer represented an extraordinary event,’ the ‘world
was no longer experiencing an influenza pandemic,’
and the response did not require ‘immediate emergency
actions on an international scale’.3
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
While regular notifications of MERS-
CoV cases were
reported to WHO for 2012–2013, approximately 10
months following the initial notification on 22 September
2012, the WHO DG convened the EC to independently
offer an expert review of the situation regarding this
novel virus. At the first meeting on 9 July 2013, the EC
determined that more information was needed, and
further time was warranted for deliberation, therefore it
was agreed that the Committee would meet in 8 days to
provide a decision. The EC met a total of 10 times between
9 July 2013 and 2 September 2015 and a PHEIC was not
declared at any point.3 Numerous countries reported
MERS-CoV cases, thus indicating there was a public health
risk to other countries through international spread.11 12
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502

In 2015, South Korea reported 186 laboratory-confirmed
cases and 38 deaths, the largest outbreak outside of the
Middle East.13 That same year, on 2 September 2015, the
EC noted that ‘[p]rogress is not yet sufficient to control
this threat and until this is achieved, individual countries
and the global community will remain at significant risk
for further outbreaks.’ Despite being a novel virus, the
EC did not consider the MERS-CoV outbreaks to be an
extraordinary event. While the EC did not explicitly state
that a coordinated international response was required,
in their final meeting they noted that ‘sectors must collaborate, among themselves and internationally,’ implying a
coordinated international response was necessary.3
Polio
The first EC meeting, on 28–29 April 2014, was convened
to discuss the international spread of wild poliovirus in
2014 and its threat to the global polio eradication initiative. The difference between the low transmission rates
for poliovirus in 2012 and early 2013 compared to a rapid
increase in transmission rates in late 2013 and into 2014
brought concern that eradication efforts were at risk. The
Committee reported all conditions for a PHEIC were
met. Since 28 April 2014, the EC convened an additional
21 times and deemed the PHEIC declaration should
continue as the risk of international spread and need
for a coordinated international response remained. The
Committee also argued that the extraordinary context
of being close to polio eradication and the concern of
complacency threatening the eradication efforts support
the argument to continue the PHEIC declaration.3
West Africa EVD
The WHO published the official notification of the
outbreak on 23 March 2014.14 The first EC was convened
over 4 months later on 6–7 August 2014 after cases had
been reported from Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone. The Committee determined the outbreak constituted an extraordinary event, posed a public health risk to
other States through international spread, and required
a coordinated international response to control the virus,
therefore concluding the ‘conditions for a (PHEIC) have
been met.’3
Zika virus
Two months after the Pan American Health Organization
and WHO published an epidemiological alert regarding
an increase in neurological disorders in areas where Zika
was reported,15 on 1 February 2016 the EC was convened
to deliberate on whether a PHEIC was constituted.3
While 25 countries in the Americas had reported cases of
Zika,16 17 there was no mention of the public health risk
to other States through international spread in the initial
meeting where a PHEIC was declared. The Committee
also did not note whether a coordinated international
response was required. There was no mention in this
meeting that the event was considered extraordinary.
However, language from a later EC meeting on 18
3
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used by the EC to explain their decision-making process.
[In accordance with the definition of a PHEIC outlined
in the IHR, the three fundamental criteria we searched
for included whether the situation constituted an extraordinary event, if there was a ‘public health risk to other
States via international spread’, and whether a coordinated international response was required.] In addition,
we identified and recorded other thematic factors that
contributed either to the determination of the three
essential IHR criteria or overall decision to declare a
PHEIC. These factors included: sustained community
transmission, gaps in knowledge of the agent or limited
response experience, impending mass gatherings, threat
to eradication and complex response settings.
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H1N1
(2009)

4

146

3

4

146

5 December 2015: first 21 January 2016:
19 May
cases identified18
Angola notifies WHO of 2016
Yellow Fever outbreak18

3 May 2018: Provincial 8 May 2018: DRC MoH 18 May
2018
Health Division reports notifies WHO19
febrile, haemorrhagic
cases and deaths19

PHEIC not
declared

PHEIC not
declared

Yellow
Fever
(2016)

 EVD
(2018)

1 December 2015:
WHO & PAHO publish
joint findings on Zika
and neurological
disorder relationship15

1 February
2016

2516 17

2516 17

3

414

103

1 July–28 November
2015: detection of
relationship between
Zika and neurological
disorders15

414

103

Zika (2016) Declared
PHEIC

23 March 2014: Guinea 6–7 August
MoH notifies WHO of
2014
EVD outbreak with 49
cases and 29 deaths14

28–29 April
2014

26 December 2013:
first case develops
symptoms38

1 January 2014: trend
of rising poliovirus
international spread
noted3

EVD (2014) Declared
PHEIC

2611 12

2

1 January 2014: trend
of rising poliovirus
international spread
noted3

911

2

Polio (2014) Declared
PHEIC

9 July 2013

25 April
2009

3

13 June 2012: first
22 September 2012
novel coronavirus case WHO first notified of
admitted to hospital29 novel coronavirus11

24 April 2009: WHO
releases first disease
outbreak News on
H1N1 and influenza-
like illness in USA and
Mexico27

3

MERS-CoV PHEIC not
(2013)
declared

18 March 2009: initial
cases of influenza-like
illness detected27

Declared
PHEIC

Event

No countries
affected at
declaration
No
or, if not
countries
declared, no
affected
countries
Date of first prior to first affected by
WHO notified of event EC3 4
EC
last EC

Epidemiological and other characteristics of events

146

4

44

8717 41

1026

1735 36

2711 30

>214
*

27

No
countries
affected
over
course of
event

Of symptomatic cases:
0.0275% (range: 0%
–1.2%)28

Case fatality ratio

Africa46

Southeast Asia,
Africa3 44

41

62.9%40

Estimated 0.025%–
0.05%37

61%47

8.8%45

Continued

Africa, North
For fetuses born to Zika-
America, South
infected mothers: 8.3%
America, Central –10.5%42 43
America,
Southeast Asia,
Western Pacific17

Africa, North
America,
Europe39

Africa, Middle
East, Pacific35 36

Middle East,
36% (range: 20%–43%)31–
Africa, Southeast 34
Asia, Europe,
North America11

Worldwide

27

Regions
affected over
course of event
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Date of initial event
PHEIC
Declaration3 4 detection

Table 1
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Declared
PHEIC

Declared
PHEIC

Event

 EVD
(2018)

COVID-19
(2020)

17 October
2018

2

183

43

1

21349
*

2

3

No
countries
affected
over
course of
event

All regions
affected21

Africa

3

Regions
affected over
course of event

Too early to report

67%14

Case fatality ratio

Polio spread over course of event is non-cumulative. Information is current as of 9 March 2020.
*Includes countries, territories and areas.
EC, Emergency Committee; EVD, Ebola virus disease; H1N1, influenza A; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; MoH, Ministry of Health; PAHO, Pan American
Health Organization; PHEIC, Public Health Emergency of International Concern.

31 December 2019:
22–23
WHO China Country
January
Office notified of
2020
cases of pneumonia of
unknown aetiology41

1 August 2018: EVD
cases confirmed,
DRC MoH declares
outbreak3

3

3

No countries
affected at
declaration
No
or, if not
countries
declared, no
affected
countries
Date of first prior to first affected by
WHO notified of event EC3 4
EC
last EC
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24 December
2019: Wuhan city
health commission
notes cases of viral
pneumonia48

28 July 2018: North
Kivu Provincial Health
Division notified
DRC MoH of acute
haemorrhagic fever
cases3

Date of initial event
PHEIC
Declaration3 4 detection

Table 1 Continued
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Yellow fever
Four months after notification of yellow fever cases in
Angola,18 the WHO DG convened an EC on 19 May
2016. There was international spread of yellow fever to
DRC, China and Kenya, and the Committee noted the
international risk posed by the outbreak. It also called
for international support for the response. Yet, the EC
determined the event did not constitute a PHEIC. The
Committee met a second time on 31 August 2016 and
reported similar findings. During both meetings, the
Committee made no note on whether the outbreak was
considered an extraordinary event.3
EVD DRC (Equateur)
The ninth EVD outbreak of DRC was declared by its
Ministry of Health on 8 May 2018 in the Equateur province19 and 10 days later the WHO DG convened the EC.
The Committee reported that the conditions for a PHEIC
had not been met. While the Committee noted that the
public health risk of international spread was high, they
considered that the robust, coordinated response by the
DRC government, WHO and partners and ‘the interventions underway provide[d] strong reason to believe
that the outbreak can be brought under control.’ The
Committee also noted that there was no actual international spread, which appeared to impact their decision
not to declare a PHEIC as they noted ‘[i]f the outbreak
expands significantly, or if there is international spread,
the Emergency Committee will be reconvened.’ The
Committee made no mention on whether the event
was considered extraordinary. Due to the brevity of the
outbreak, only one EC meeting was convened.3
EVD DRC (North Kivu and Ituri)
On 17 October 2018 the WHO DG convened the first
EC for DRC’s 10th EVD outbreak, centred in the North
Kivu and Ituri provinces. A PHEIC was not declared until
the fourth EC meeting on 17 July 2019. The Committee
expressed in multiple meetings that a PHEIC declaration
may be detrimental to the ongoing response. For example,
in the second EC meeting, the Committee noted ‘there
is no added benefit to declaring a PHEIC at this stage,’
and in the third EC meeting, ‘[t]he Committee extensively debated the impact of a PHEIC declaration on the
response, possible unintended consequences, and how
these might be managed.’ During the first two meetings,
while the EC reported that while there was a high risk
of spread at the national and regional levels, it did not
6

think that transnational spread beyond bordering countries was likely. The Committee gave no indication as to
whether the noted risk of regional spread met the IHR
criterion of a ‘public health risk to other States through
international spread’. However, during the third EC
meeting on 14 June 2019 the Committee ‘acknowledged
that recent cases in Uganda constitute international
spread of disease’ and considered the outbreak had a
risk of international spread. The Committee called for
the DRC government, WHO, and partners to intensify
the response to ensure the situation did not deteriorate
during earlier meetings, but it did not specifically state
a coordinated international response was needed until
the fourth meeting. During the third EC, the Committee
explicitly reported the event as extraordinary, acknowledged the risk of the disease spreading to neighbouring
countries—as cases had been reported in Uganda—
and called for the international community to ‘step up
funding and support’ for the response. However, the EC
still stated that the outbreak ‘[did] not meet all the three
criteria for a PHEIC’ at the time.1 It was not until the
following meeting when the Committee stated ‘[i]t was
the view of the Committee that a coordinated international response under the International Health Regulations (2005) is required. Thus, the conditions for a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)
under the IHR (2005) have been met.’3 The EC has met
an additional two times and advised for a continuation of
a PHEIC declaration as ‘[t]he Committee was concerned
that withdrawing the PHEIC now might have adverse
consequences for the response efforts through diminishing focus.’3 4
Coronavirus disease-2019
China notified WHO of a cluster of pneumonia cases
with unknown aetiology on 31 December 2019,20 and
the WHO DG convened the EC approximately 3 weeks
later on 22–23 January 2020. At the time, 557 cases were
reported, and four countries confirmed exported (travel-
related) cases from China. Similar to previous EC meetings for MERS, polio and West Africa Ebola, the first EC
meeting for novel coronavirus did not reach a decision
on the first day of meeting, but continued its deliberations on the next day due to the need for additional
information and deliberation. In the EC statement, the
Committee noted that ‘it is expected that further international exportation of cases may appear in any country,’
implying an ongoing public health risk to other States
via international spread. While it was reported that
‘members of the Emergency Committee expressed divergent views on whether this event constitutes a PHEIC
or not,’ ultimately a PHEIC was not declared at the end
of 23 January. As seen with MERS-CoV, the WHO DG
suggested the EC reconvene in a matter of days to reassess the evolving situation and provide an updated determination on whether the event constitutes a PHEIC. The
EC met again on 30 January 2020, when there were 7711
confirmed cases in China and an additional 83 reported
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502
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November 2016 indicated that the unknown, apparent
association between Zika and neurological disorders
was considered an extraordinary event. [The EC did not
determine that Zika itself was a PHEIC, but rather the
report of Zika cases with the additional concern of neurological disorders constituted a PHEIC]. The EC met a
total of five times from February 2016 to 18 November
2016 and noted the gaps in knowledge of the virus and
its consequences.3
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cases in 18 other countries, at which time the EC ‘agreed
that the outbreak now meets the criteria for a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern.’ The EC
reiterated its language from the prior meeting regarding
risk of importation, indicating an ongoing public health
risk to other States via international spread. Additionally,
the EC stated in the second meeting that they ‘felt that
a global coordinated effort is needed.’ Neither the first
nor second EC meeting noted whether or not the event
was considered extraordinary.3 At the time of writing,
COVID-19 was reported in countries on six continents,
spreading rapidly including through community transmission.21
Discussion
Figure 13 4 outlines which criteria and thematic factors
were explicitly stated or implied as contributing to the EC
recommendation to the WHO DG.
We find considerable inconsistency in statements issued
by the EC regarding their determination of whether
the IHR criteria for a PHEIC have been met. The ECs
did not always require each of the three conditions to
be met in order to recommend that a PHEIC should
be declared. During the first Zika EC meeting when a
PHEIC was recommended, there was no explicit mention
of a risk of international spread nor did the EC state that
a coordinated, international response was required. In
contrast, the EC determined the yellow fever outbreaks
in 2016 did not constitute a PHEIC even though they
stated the outbreaks posed a public health risk to other
States through international spread and indicated that
enhanced international support was needed.3
When the ECs did reference specific PHEIC criteria,
they were often inconsistent in their interpretation of
whether the criteria were met. For example, for some
events (H1N1, polio and the West Africa EVD outbreak)
ECs interpreted the criterion of ‘requiring a coordinated
international response’ to mean that the event required
such coordination, but did necessitate that on-
going
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502

coordination be enhanced or improved in order for
the criterion to be met. In contrast, for the ninth DRC
EVD outbreak, the EC argued that while the ‘response
should be supported by the entire international community’ implying the need for a coordinated international
response, a PHEIC was not necessary because the existing
response was ‘rapid and comprehensive’ and there was
reason to believe the outbreak could be brought under
control. Similarly, for the 10th DRC EVD outbreak, in
earlier meetings, the Committee noted ‘[t]he government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, WHO, and
partners must intensify the current response’ indicating
a coordinated international response was underway;
however, the EC did not acknowledge that the criterion
of a coordinated international response was met until the
forth EC meeting on 17 July 2019.3
The criterion for determining if an event is considered extraordinary was also interpreted inconsistently.
For both H1N1 and Zika, insufficient knowledge about
the virus was cited as a factor in these situations being
deemed extraordinary events. In contrast, the EC s never
stated that MERS-CoV and COVID-19 (both outbreaks
resulting from novel viruses for which there were significant gaps in knowledge of disease aetiology) constituted
an extraordinary event.3
ECs varied in their interpretation of and the supporting
evidence used to assess the criterion of there being a
risk of international spread. The EC was inconsistent
in whether it required that international spread to have
already occurred vs there simply being risk that spread
could occur in order for this criterion to be met. In
some cases (H1N1, polio, West Africa EVD, yellow fever,
ninth DRC EVD outbreak, 10th DRC EVD outbreak),
the EC noted the threat of international spread when a
disease involved sustained human-to-human or community transmission. However, despite the absence of
sustained human-to-human transmission, the EC considered MERS-CoV outbreak to have a risk of international
spread stating ‘the possibility of international spread
7
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Figure 1 Outlines which criteria and thematic factors were explicitly stated or implied as contributing to the Emergency
Committee recommendation to the WHO Director-General. COVID-19, coronavirus disease-2019; EVD, Ebola virus disease;
H1N1, influenza A; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; PHEIC, Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
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whether the event met each of the three criteria and to
list corresponding evidence to support the presence/
absence of each criterion. In addition, the EC should
offer detailed explanation of how they interpreted the
criteria. In order to standardise the EC review process
and ensure explanations are provided to clearly justify
decisions on PHEIC declarations and non-declarations,
EC members should undergo further training regarding
the authorities and decision-making criteria established
by the IHR, a sentiment that is shared by other public
health and international law experts.22 Notably, global
health law experts have not been part of the composition
of ECs.3 4 Adding legal expertise to future EC deliberations will help to resolve confusion about the IHR criteria
and promote consistency with previous decisions.
Going forward, the WHO should, in consultation with
member states and legal experts, develop clear guidelines
to aid ECs in interpreting PHEIC criteria. In particular,
there seems to be confusion among EC members as to
whether the ‘risk of international spread’ criterion has to
involve documented international spread. The IHRs do
not specify that international spread must have already
occurred and it would likely be against the spirit of the
IHRs, which aim to reduce international spread of infectious diseases, for the ECs to need to wait until international spread has occurred in order to declare a PHEIC.1
The makeup of the EC is ill-
equipped to address
political and social considerations. While these considerations are important and relevant factors to take into
account when responding to an outbreak, the IHR does
not provide the ECs with the authority to consider the
political and social implications. The ECs should disavow
including these concerns in their deliberations and
ensure that they only consider the available technical
evidence on whether the three core criteria have or have
not been met when determining if the event constitutes a
PHEIC. Other avenues should be used to account for the
political and social considerations as they are a necessary
component of ensuring a robust and successful response
to a health emergency. Box 1 provides a summary of the
recommendations outlined in this paper.
With more consistency and transparency in EC justifications, there could be a better understanding on how the
EC and the WHO DG reach their decision on whether
an event should be considered a PHEIC. Similarly, as
previous PHEIC determinations are often reviewed to
compare the decision-making processes between public
health events, a more structured approach should be
provided that explicitly states what criteria were met and
how the EC determined that each criterion was satisfied.
This approach will remove some ambiguity and enable
the international community to gain further insight into
the EC’s thought process and their recommendations on
whether to declare a PHEIC.
It is essential for PHEIC declarations to be made based
on science, not politics. In recent convenings, ECs have
seemed reluctant to recommend a PHEIC declaration,
noting the potential for countries to respond with trade
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502
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remains of concern’ on 4 February 2015. For polio, an
impending mass gathering, the Hajj, was used as rationale to continue a PHEIC declaration due to the risk it
posed for international spread. However, for MERS-CoV,
the EC did not note that they considered the Hajj a factor
that contributed to the risk of international spread. The
upcoming Olympics were also acknowledged during
Zika EC meetings and it was recognised that mass gatherings can pose additional risks to international spread.
It was ultimately deemed that with proper public health
control measures, the risk of the Olympics contributing
to international spread was negligible, and therefore, not
factored into this criterion.3
By design, this study only reviewed the official statements of EC meetings to identify and analyse the rationale provided and determine if PHEIC criteria were
present or absent. Most, but not all, EC meetings were
followed by a press conference where the DG and the
chair of the EC provided a verbal report of the meeting
and answer questions posed by journalists. While these
press conferences often allowed for further clarification
of the EC decision, whether or not additional, clarifying
information was relayed at press conferences was often
contingent on the types of questions that happened to be
asked by member of the press. As a result, these conferences cannot be viewed as a replacement for EC reports
as a vehicle for explaining the rationale used by the EC
in deciding whether an event met each of IHR criteria
for a PHEIC declaration. To ensure there is complete
understanding of the analysis and decision-making of the
EC, the official reports of the EC should contain all of
the necessary information regarding which IHR criteria
were determined to have been. Transparency in this IHR
process must be prioritised and, therefore, the official EC
statements must provide a clear indication of how each
of the three IHR criteria were deemed to have been met
and include all the relevant information necessary to
justify the decision to recommend declaration (or not)
of a PHEIC.
Lack of consistency and clarity regarding the EC and
the WHO DG’s decision-making contributes to ongoing
concerns about a lack of transparency in the PHEIC
process and other public disagreements with PHEIC
declarations.9 Though ECs may have discussed each
outbreak with greater clarity and consistency than what
was publicly reported, it is important that the public representation of the EC’s rationale be fully articulated so that
Member States and outside observers have a full record
of the EC’s decision-making process. Lack of transparency surrounding the EC process has been a continuous
point of contention for public health experts who noted
the original reticence of WHO to disclose the identity of
EC members following the H1N1 EC deliberations.22
Similarly, it is important that the EC’s recommendations are seen as consistent with the expectations of the
IHR.
We recommend that in future convenings, the EC
standardise their reviews of events to specifically address
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1. Emergency Committees (ECs) should standardise their review of

2.

3.
4.

5.

an outbreak to specifically address whether the event met each of
the criteria for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC); the outbreak should constitute as an extraordinary event,
be a public health risk to other Member States though international spread of disease, and require a coordinated, international
response.
WHO should include global health law experts in the composition of future EC meetings to ensure proper legal advice on the
International Health Regulations criteria can be shared with EC
members and properly applied during the decision-making process.
WHO, Member States and legal experts should develop clear guidelines to aid ECs in interpreting PHEIC criteria.
ECs should only consider the available technical evidence of events
when determine if criteria for a PHEIC are met rather than incorporating additional considerations in the deliberations such as the
political implications.
The EC should endeavour to provide clear and consistent statements outlining the decision-making process for PHEIC declarations. This would include a standardised statement reviewing their
discussions and listing evidence to support their determination of
the presence or absence of each PHEIC criterion.

and travel measures that could harm response to the
health event.3 23 Though concerns that countries may
pursue harmful measures to stop the importation of
disease are legitimate,24 the decision-
making process
established by the IHR does not accommodate these
political considerations.1 The ECs should review the
potential public health impact of the event and limit
their decision-making to a technical assessment of each
event. The WHO should address separately, outside of
the PHEIC declaration process, the problem of Member
States taking actions that are inconsistent with WHO
recommendations and place unnecessary travel and
trade restrictions on affected countries, which would be
detrimental to both the country and the response efforts.
PHEIC declarations are not the entire focus of the
IHR. The Regulations also require countries to develop
capacities to detect and report potential PHEICs.1 If
there is a lack of understanding of the rationale that EC
uses to recommend PHEIC declarations, or if PHEIC
declarations are seen to be political, it could undermine
confidence in the IHR. Though the IHR are instruments
of law, their impact depends on countries’ willingness
to comply. It is essential for future compliance with the
IHR that the WHO, ECs and Member States interpret the
framework as written. If the Regulations are thought to
be inadequate in supporting assessment and response to
international public health emergencies, then a revision
of the IHR may be necessary. Following the EC’s recommendation to declare the on-going COVID-19 epidemic
a PHEIC, the WHO DG expressed frustration with the
binary decision-making set up by the IHRs and suggested
that a tiered decision-
making tool, with an intermediary measure, may be more useful to gauge the level of
Mullen L, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002502. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002502

emergency posed by health events.3 Such a suggestion
would likely require a revision of the IHR, as the decision
instrument contained in Annex 2 does not accommodate
a multi-phase declaration.
Conclusion
This first comprehensive review of EC statements found
considerable inconsistency in the justifications dictating
which criteria were considered to be met and how the
criteria were considered to be satisfied. Recently debates
about the value and timing of PHEIC declarations have
also called into question the benefit and impact of PHEIC
declarations.25 26 Some of these concerns may stem from
lack of understanding of EC’s rationale and EC’s lack of
agreement and/or understanding of PHEIC criteria set
forth by the IHR. Striving for more consistency and transparency in the EC justifications around PHEIC declarations would benefit future deliberations and help to
build more understanding and support for the process.
Twitter Lucia Mullen @LuciaMullen17
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